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A commentary on
No need to match: a comment on Bach, Nicholson and Hudson’s “Affordance-Matching
Hypothesis”
by Uithol, S., andMaranesi, M. (2014). Front. Hum. Neurosci. 8:710. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2014.00710
We are grateful for Uithol and Maranesi’s (2014) insightful comments on our article “The
affordance-matching hypothesis: How objects guide action understanding and prediction” (Bach
et al., 2014). There, we argued that action understanding is not well-accounted for by process
in which observed actions are simply matched, based on kinematic information, to an action in
one’s motor repertoire. Instead, we proposed that action understanding draws heavily on object
information. Humans represent objects in terms of both (1) the goals that can be achieved with
them (function knowledge), and (2) the specific motor behaviors required to achieve these goals
(manipulation knowledge). This knowledge can make a major contribution to action observation,
allowing observers not only to infer the goals someone wants to achieve with an object (via function
knowledge) but also to predict the actions that this person would need to carry out to achieve these
goals (via manipulation knowledge).
A key question in such a view is what derives the affordances—the known manipulations—of
objects handled by other people. As Uithol and Maranesi rightly point out, and as we conclude
in our article, canonical neurons are an unlikely candidate. While canonical neurons indeed seem
to encode actions one can perform with an object (grasping, tearing), their firing is restricted to
the peripersonal space, coding for actions the monkey could do itself. A much better candidate
are the mirror-canonical neurons discovered by Bonini et al. (2014), which fulfill a similar role in
the peripersonal space of other people. They fire both when the monkey sees an object, and when
seeing someone else perform an appropriate action on the object. The Bonini et al. (2014) study was
published shortly before our article, and we were only able to discuss it briefly in our paper. Yet, the
response properties of these neurons match the predictions of affordance matching perfectly, and
we are grateful to Uithol and Maranesi for further highlighting them. They nicely complement the
wealth of behavioral evidence that reveal that observers extract object affordances for other people,
even outside their own peripersonal space (for a review, see Creem-Regehr et al., 2013), and that
mental simulation of hand-object interactions shows similarly lateralized motor activity as when
actually performing such manipulations (e.g., when Borghi and Scorolli, 2009; Marino et al., 2012).
Next to highlighting this supportive evidence, Uithol and Maranesi provide two challenges for
the affordance-matching hypothesis. First, we had argued that mirror neurons are not independent
action recognizers. Instead, their purpose is confirmatory: they check whether one of the object’s
potential manipulations is indeed occurring (e.g., opening a peanut, grasping an apple; for similar
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arguments, see Kilner et al., 2007; Csibra, 2008). Support for
this idea comes, among other findings reviewed in our article,
from the observation that mirror neurons do not fire for a motor
act in isolation, but only when it is directed to an appropriate
object (Gallese et al., 1996) and that firing subsides quickly when
the hand deviates from the predicted path. In contrast to this
view, Uithol and Maranesi argue that mirror neurons could also
recognize actions independently. They point to the audiovisual
mirror neurons discovered by Kohler et al. (Kohler et al., 2002;
Keysers et al., 2003). These neurons fire not only when an
object-directed action is seen, but also when it is merely heard
(e.g., the sound of a peanut breaking). As sound provides no
object information, Uithol and Maranesi argue there is no prior
affordance against which the action can be matched, arguing
against an affordance matching interpretation of mirror neurons.
However, in our article, we specifically considered such
cases in which action recognition occurs with little prior object
information (e.g., because objects are hidden from view or actions
are pantomimed). We argued that, in such cases, the action
would not be matched to a seen object, but to a much greater
variety of affordances of objects in memory. Identifying such a
match would therefore be slow and effortful, unless the observed
movements are highly idiosyncratic, or the potential objects
had already been constrained by the prior context. Strikingly,
all these considerations seem to apply to the original Kohler
studies. They tested a very limited set of six actions, on which
the monkeys were extensively trained, and which were shown
repeatedly, in random order, during the experiment. Thus, while
vision did not provide object information directly, the potential
set of objects was nevertheless highly constrained, and the heard
actions could be efficiently matched to one of these alternatives.
To our knowledge this has not been tested yet in monkeys, but
affordance matching would predict that these auditory mirror
neuron responses would be very much delayed or reduced, if no
such prior experimental object context would be available.
Finally, we had proposed that function and manipulation
knowledge about objects could interact, in a productive manner,
during action observation. Knowing somebody’s goals will
predict exactly which manipulations are required with an object
to achieve this goal, supporting action prediction. Conversely,
recognizing a known way of manipulating an object allows one
to infer which of the object’s functions the actor wants to realize,
supporting action interpretation. Uithol and Maranesi argue that
a single process, similar to pattern completion processes in vision,
could account for both. In this view, an object representation
linking a goal (driving in a nail), an object (a hammer),
and a required manipulation (forceful downwards movements)
provides such a pattern, which is filled in if one aspect is missing
(as long as the overall pattern is recognized). We are not averse to
this possibility. The affordance-matching hypothesis is relatively
agnostic as to how the proposed mechanism is implemented.
What we would like to argue—and this was the purpose of
the paper—is that as soon as an architecture linking objects,
goals and body movements is established it can be used for
both purposes: prediction (when likely movements are inferred
from objects and goals) and interpretation (when likely goals are
inferred from how the object is manipulated). Thus, rather than
reflecting different processes, prediction and understanding are
different processing outcomes that arise (a) from the completeness
of the stimulus, and (b) from the task. For example, coordinating
our own action with that of another person (e.g., handing over
an object) requires efficient prediction. In contrast, longer-term
predictions about others’ behavior require knowledge of their
goals.
Importantly, though, and this is perhaps the main point of
disagreement, we do not believe that, even if there was such
a pattern completion process, this would negate the “need to
match.” In vision, only the simplest possible patterns can be
“filled in” without recourse to prior knowledge, for example,
in cases of edge extensions or extrapolation of retinal motion.
Instead, it requires that a matching pattern at a higher cortical
level is activated (Rao and Ballard, 1999). Completion is possible
precisely because this matching representation can provide the
missing information. This is not an out-dated “cognitivist”
assumption either: Recent predictive coding models see it as the
core of general brain function, across all levels of the cortical
hierarchy (Barsalou, 2009; Friston and Kiebel, 2009). The brain
constantly forms higher-level hypotheses about the environment,
which are propagated downwards and tested against the sensory
input. Prediction errors are fed back upwards so that matching
hypothesis can be confirmed, and mismatching ones are revised
until they match the sensory input. The affordance matching
view is directly informed by these views. Objects provide both
hypotheses about potential goals (the object’s function), and a
means for testing them against the currently observed action (the
associatedmanipulations). Object knowledge, therefore, provides
the “patterns” against which seen actions can be compared, and
from which their goal can be derived.
We would like to end by noting that in the year since
publication several studies have provided evidence for the
different components of our model. For example, Thioux and
Keysers (2015) demonstrated direct links between connectivity
in parietal-premotor “mirror” circuits and the ability to
anticipate which of two objects someone else is going to
grasp, providing evidence for an encoding of object–action
affordance relationships in these areas. Similarly, Schubotz et al.
(2014) showed that activity in some of these regions increased
parametrically with the number of actions afforded by the
goal object, in line with the notion that observed actions
are indeed matched against action “hypotheses” derived from
objects. Finally, Maranesi et al. (2014) revealed predictive firing
of mirror neurons before action initiation, if the context (a go
signal) implied that the observed actor had a goal of reaching
toward the object. This provided direct support for the idea that
prior goal assumptions specify which action someone will carry
out with an object, which can then be tested against the actual
visual input. Indeed, we have recently provided direct evidence
for this idea, by showing that top-down predictions directly feed
into even low-level perceptual representations of observed motor
acts, biasing them further toward the assumed goals than they
really were (Hudson et al., 2015, 2016).
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